Isaca ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst CCOA Exam Dumps: Updated Questions & Answers (May 2025)

To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.

Locate the alert file:

alert_33.pdf

Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.

Key Information to Extract:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:

File hashes

IP addresses

Hostnames

Keywords related to the compromise

Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System

Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.

Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.

Step 3: Set Up Your Search

Time Filter:

Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).

Keyword Filter:

Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.

IOC Correlation:

Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).

Example SIEM Query:

index=host_logs

| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")

| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id

Step 4: Analyze the Results

Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.

Focus on:

Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM

Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)

Example Output:

_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id

2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33

Step 5: Verify the Host

Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.

Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.

The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01

Step 6: Mitigation and Response

Isolate the Compromised Host:

Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.

Conduct Forensic Analysis:

Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.

Patch and Update:

Apply security updates and patches.

Threat Hunting:

Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.

Step 7: Document and Report

Create a detailed incident report:

Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM

Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01

Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)

By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!

To identify thefile namethat triggered theRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theaccounting-pcworkstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the SIEM System

Open your web browser and navigate to theSIEM dashboard.

Log in with youradministrator credentials.

Step 2: Set Up the Query

Go to theSearchorQuerysection of the SIEM.

Set theTime Rangeto thelast 24 hours.

Query Parameters:

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Rule Name:Suspicious PowerShell

Event Type:Startup items or Process creation

Step 3: Construct the SIEM Query

Here’s an example of how to construct the query:

Example Query (Splunk):

index=windows_logs

| search agent.name="accounting-pc" RuleName="Suspicious PowerShell"

| where _time > now() - 24h

| table _time, agent.name, process_name, file_path, RuleName

Example Query (Elastic SIEM):

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "agent.name": "accounting-pc" }},

{ "match": { "RuleName": "Suspicious PowerShell" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "now-24h" }}}

]

}

}

}

Step 4: Analyze the Query Results

The query should return a table or list containing:

Time of Execution

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Process Name

File Path

Rule Name

Example Output:

_time

agent.name

process_name

file_path

RuleName

2024-04-07T10:45:23

accounting-pc

powershell.exe

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Suspicious PowerShell

Step 5: Identify the Suspicious File

Theprocess_namein the output showspowershell.exeexecuting a suspicious script.

Thefile pathindicates the script responsible:

makefile

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

The suspicious script file is:

calc.ps1

Step 6: Confirm the Malicious Nature

Manual Inspection:

Navigate to the specified file path on theaccounting-pcworkstation.

Check the contents of calc.ps1 for any malicious PowerShell code.

Hash Verification:

Generate theSHA256 hashof the file and compare it with known malware signatures.

Answer:

calc.ps1

Step 7: Immediate Response

Isolate the Workstation:Disconnectaccounting-pcfrom the network.

Terminate the Malicious Process:

Stop the powershell.exe process running calc.ps1.

Use Task Manager or a script:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Remove the Malicious Script:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Scan for Persistence Mechanisms:

CheckStartup itemsandScheduled Tasksfor any references to calc.ps1.

Step 8: Documentation

Record the following:

Date and Time:When the incident was detected.

Affected Host:accounting-pc

Malicious File:calc.ps1

Actions Taken:File removal and process termination.

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:

12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Source of information:

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Prepare for Investigation

2.1: Ensure Access to the File

Check if the PDF exists:

ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"

Open the file to inspect:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

2.2: Analyze the Content

Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.

Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).

Example:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

threat-site.xyz

Step 3: Locate Network Logs

3.1: Find the Logs Directory

The logs could be located in one of the following directories:

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/httpd/

/var/log/nginx/

Navigate to the likely directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Identify relevant network or DNS logs:

ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"

Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts

4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe

Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log

Explanation:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.

Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.

4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names

To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log

If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log

Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe

5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results

Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"

Sample Output:

2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50

2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75

Interpretation:

The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.

Step 6: Verification and Documentation

6.1: Verify Domain Matches

Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Ensure that the time matches the specified range.

6.2: Save the Results for Reporting

Save the output to a file:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Review the saved file:

cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Step 7: Report the Findings

Final Answer:

Domain(s) Contacted:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

Time of Contact:

Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Reasoning:

Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.

Step 8: Recommendations:

Immediate Block:

Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Monitor for Further Activity:

Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.

Perform IOC Scanning:

Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.

Incident Report:

Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.

Even when a database environment isencrypted at rest and in transit, data theft can still occur due tomisconfigured access control lists (ACLs).

Why ACL Misconfiguration Is Likely:

Access Permissions:If ACLs are not correctly configured, unauthorized users might gain access despite encryption.

Insider Threats:Legitimate users with excessive permissions can misuse access.

Access via Compromised Accounts:If user accounts with broad ACL permissions are compromised, encryption alone will not protect data.

Encryption Is Not Enough:Encryption protects data in transit and at rest, but once decrypted for use, weak ACLs can expose the data.

Other options analysis:

A. Group rights for access:Not as directly related as misconfigured ACLs.

B. Improper backup procedures:Would affect data recovery, not direct access.

D. Insufficiently strong encryption:Data was accessed, indicating apermission issue, not weak encryption.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Access Control and Data Protection:Discusses the importance of proper ACL configurations.

Chapter 9: Database Security Practices:Highlights common access control pitfalls.

Performingregular code reviews throughout developmentis the most effective method for reducing application risk:

Early Detection:Identifies security vulnerabilities before deployment.

Code Quality:Improves security practices and coding standards among developers.

Static Analysis:Ensures compliance with secure coding practices, reducing common vulnerabilities (like injection or XSS).

Continuous Improvement:Incorporates feedback into future development cycles.

Incorrect Options:

A. Regular third-party risk assessments:Important but does not directly address code-level risks.

C. Regular vulnerability scans after deployment:Identifies issues post-deployment, which is less efficient.

D. Regular monitoring of application use:Helps detect anomalies but not inherent vulnerabilities.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Secure Software Development," Subsection "Code Review Practices" - Code reviews are critical for proactively identifying security flaws during development.

When discussing a remediation plan for acritical vulnerability, it is essential to include arollback planbecause:

Post-Implementation Issues:Changes can cause unexpected issues or system instability.

Risk Mitigation:A rollback plan ensures quick restoration to the previous state if problems arise.

Best Practice:Always plan for potential failures when applying significant security changes.

Change Management:Ensures continuity by maintaining a safe fallback option.

Other options analysis:

A. Canceling remediation:This is not a proactive or practical approach.

C. Severity-based rollback:Rollback plans should be standard regardless of severity.

D. Additional staff presence:Does not eliminate the need for a rollback strategy.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 9: Change Management in Security Operations:Emphasizes rollback planning during critical changes.

Chapter 8: Vulnerability Management:Discusses post-remediation risk considerations.

Thegreatest risk resulting from a DNS cache poisoning attackis theloss of sensitive data. Here’s why:

DNS Cache Poisoning:An attacker corrupts the DNS cache to redirect users from legitimate sites to malicious ones.

Phishing and Data Theft:Users think they are accessing legitimate websites (like banking portals) but are unknowingly entering sensitive data into fake sites.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks:Attackers can intercept data traffic, capturing credentials or personal information.

Data Exfiltration:Once credentials are stolen, attackers can access internal systems, leading to data loss.

Other options analysis:

A. Reduced system availability:While DNS issues can cause outages, this is secondary to data theft in poisoning scenarios.

B. Noncompliant operations:While potential, this is not the primary risk.

C. Loss of network visibility:Unlikely since DNS poisoning primarily targets user redirection, not network visibility.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses DNS attacks and their potential consequences.

Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Incident Response:Details how DNS poisoning can lead to data compromise.

Smishing(SMS phishing) involvessending malicious text messagesposing as legitimate entities to trick individuals into disclosing sensitive information or clicking malicious links.

Social Engineering via SMS:Attackers often impersonate trusted institutions (like banks) to induce fear or urgency.

Tactics:Typically include fake alerts, password reset requests, or promotional offers.

Impact:Users may unknowingly provide login credentials, credit card information, or download malware.

Example:A message claiming to be from a bank asking users to verify their account by clicking a link.

Other options analysis:

A. Hacking:General term, does not specifically involve SMS.

B. Vishing:Voice phishing via phone calls, not text messages.

D. Cyberstalking:Involves persistent harassment rather than deceptive messaging.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Social Engineering Tactics:Explores phishing variants, including smishing.

Chapter 8: Threat Intelligence and Attack Techniques:Details common social engineering attack vectors.

In theIaaS (Infrastructure as a Service)model, clients are responsible formanaging and updating the operating systembecause:

Client Responsibility:The provider supplies virtualized computing resources (e.g., VMs), but OS maintenance remains with the client.

Flexibility:Users can install, configure, and update OSs according to their needs.

Examples:AWS EC2, Microsoft Azure VMs.

Compared to Other Models:

SaaS:The provider manages the entire stack, including the OS.

DBaaS:Manages databases without requiring OS maintenance.

PaaS:The platform is managed, leaving no need for direct OS updates.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 10: Cloud Security and IaaS Management:Discusses client responsibilities in IaaS environments.

Chapter 9: Cloud Deployment Models:Explains how IaaS differs from SaaS and PaaS.